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Franchising as a legal or marketing concept was not new. It arose as a structured 
business system in the US, around 1860´s when The Singer Company established a 
network of resellers for sewing machines. Nowadays franchising is one of the fastest 
developing forms of business in the world. The evolution of theories that seek to explain 
franchise systems have been published in academic journals from time to time, but until 
now there was not a study that have established a social network analysis to quantify 
the degree of centrality and cohesion of the relationship between the main authors, 
journals, methods and theories in franchise. Therefore, the main purpose of this study 
is to extend the knowledge about franchising through an extensive research on its main 
theoretical perspectives into relevant international academic journals, showing the 
evolution of the field, highlighting the principal issues, authors and methods. Through a 
selection of 130 articles ranging from 1966 to 2015 the study investigates five relevant 
theories in franchising: (1) Resource Acquisition Theory, (2) Agency Theory, (3) 
Transaction Cost Analysis, (4) Signaling Theory, and (5) Property Rights Theory. A 
descriptive statistical analysis was done in order to identify the main authors and trends 
with the most used associated theories in franchise papers. The findings show agency 
theory and signaling theory, and resource scarcity theory as the main perspectives used 
in studies about franchising, but other perspectives have been increasing its presence, 
mainly the institutional theory and resource based-view perspective. The main 
dependent and independent variables cover a wide range of constructs, but ownership, 
performance, age, size, growth, geographical dispersion, and internationalization have 
been the most cited. 
© 2017 Internext | ESPM. All rights reserved! 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Franchising as a legal or marketing concept was not 
new. It arose as a structured business system in the 
US, around 1860´s when The Singer Company 
established a network of resellers for sewing 
machines (Antonowicz, 2011; Marques, 2006). In 
Brazil franchising surges in 1963 with the 
establishment of the Yazigi language schools 
network, and with the growth of malls contributing to 
the expansion of the system during de 80´s and 90´s 
(Marques, 2006). 
Nowadays franchising is one of the fastest 
developing forms of business in the world. It can be 
conceptualized as a system of marketing goods 
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and/or services and/or technology, which is based 
upon a close and ongoing collaboration between 
legally and financially separate and independent 
undertakings, that is, the franchisor and its individual 
franchisees, whereby the franchisor grants its 
individual franchisee the right, and imposes the 
obligation, to conduct a business in accordance with 
the franchisor’s concept (Antonowicz, 2011). 
Franchising also combines decentralized 
ownership of physical assets with centralized brand 
name ownership and provision of operational know-
how, and can be seen as facilitating growth by 
younger business chains, as it eases constraints on 
the supply of factors. Rapid initial growth may be 
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necessary because promotion and advertising of a 
brand image is likely to be subject to both real and 
pecuniary economies of scale and almost all services 
and most physical outputs provided by the franchised 
business are difficult to protect from imitation, and 
this can involve expansion to preempt a rival´s entry 
(Thompson, 1994). 
Franchising is a rich field for studies not only in the 
Marketing arena, but also in another relevant areas 
such as economics, law, management, finance and 
entrepreneurship (Grewal, Iyer, Javalgi, & Radulovich, 
2011), thanks to its varied possibilities of governance 
formats and studies about inter-organizational 
behaviors (Dant, Grünhagen, & Windsperger, 2011). 
This plethora of perspectives has been inspired 
academic research in several areas – franchising as a 
vehicle for entering business ownership 
(entrepreneurship), as distribution channel 
(marketing), as a leading venue for understanding the 
structure of contracts (economics), as an important 
organizational form (strategic management) (J. G. 
Combs, Michael, & Castrogiovanni, 2004) - mainly 
focusing in such facets as contractual arrangements, 
pricing strategies, franchised chain advertising, 
ownership patterns, territorial encroachment 
implications and internationalization (Chabowski, 
Hult, & Mena, 2011). 
These issues are investigated on the lenses of 
many perspectives, but five of them are the most 
prevalent (Dant et al., 2011) - resource acquisition 
theory (Oxenfeldt & Kelly, 1969), agency theory 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983a, 1983b), transaction cost 
analysis (WILLIAMSON, 1985), signaling Theory 
(Gallini & Lutz, 1992; Gallini & Wright, 1990) and 
property rights theory (Demsetz, 1966; Hart & 
Moore, 1990; Maness, 1996) - although scholars have 
been using many other theoretical perspective 
approaches as well – stakeholder theory (D. Altinay & 
Miles, 2006), tournament theory (James G. Combs, 
Ketchen Jr, & Short, 2011; Gillis, McEwan, Crook, & 
Michael, 2011) , institutional theory (D. Altinay & 
Miles, 2006), RBV (Barthélemy, 2008; J. G. Combs et 
al., 2004; Fladmoe-Lindquist, 1996), upper echelons 
theory (J. G. Combs et al., 2004), learning theory (J. G. 
Combs, Ketchen, Shook, & Short, 2010); plural theory 
(Dant & Kaufmann, 2003), risk-sharing theory (Hsu, 
Jang, & Canter, 2010), social exchange theory (James 
G. Combs et al., 2011), resource dependence theory 
(Dant & Gundlach, 1999), among other perspectives. 
The following topics presents in detail these first 
five theories and their relevance to the franchise 
field. The main objective of this study is to extend the 
knowledge about franchising through an extensive 
research on its main theoretical perspectives into 
relevant international academic journals, showing 
the evolution of the field, highlighting the principal 
issues, authors and methods, identifying the most 
used theories and constructs in franchise publications 
along the last 30 years. 
2. THEORETICAL EVOLUTION IN FRANCHISING 
2.1 Resource acquisition theory 
Oxenfeldt and Kelly published in 1969 an article 
entitled “Will successful franchise systems ultimately 
become wholly-owned chains?” which states 
franchising as part of a life cycle, where this system is 
adopted by firms to overcome scarce resources in 
their effort to growth, reverting in the future toward 
company ownership (Gillis et al., 2011). Oxenfeldt 
and Kelly were the first to formulate the termed 
resource scarcity view, which asserts that a nascent 
firm builds a brand in order to create economies of 
scale in advertising and purchasing (J. G. Combs et al., 
2010; Oxenfeldt & Kelly, 1969). New ventures need 
faster growth in comparison to established firms in 
order to compete successfully. Franchising is a 
method which permits new firms to rapidly penetrate 
the market and achieve access to key resources 
(Oxenfeldt & Kelly, 1969). 
Franchising, therefore, would be an alternative to 
overcome constraints to growth, as lack of trained 
managers and financial capital (Michael, 2003). 
According to the resource scarcity view, franchisees 
are seen as an inexpensive source of capital, enabling 
the franchisor to raise capital at a lower cost than 
other possible arrangements (Norton, 1988). Another 
prediction of the resource scarcity view is that 
franchisors will maintain the ownership over new 
outlets and will tend to repurchase the old ones in the 
extent to which economies of scale are achieved (J. 
G. Combs et al., 2010), in a phenomenon known as 
ownership redirection (Dant, Paswan, & Kaufmann, 
1996). 
In this view, franchising would be advantageous to 
a franchisor mainly during the early years, when 
fundamental resources as financial capital, 
information regarding advantageous places for 
business, labor supply and managers to implement 
the system at dispersed locations would be necessary 
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to implement and develop the business concept and 
achieve economies of scale. Along with the success of 
the chain other sources of financing will be available 
to franchisors, as well as their abilities and 
competencies in managerial labor training and site 
searching (Oxenfeldt & Kelly, 1969; Dant, Kaufmann, 
& Paswan, 1992; Michael, 2003). Once economies of 
scale have been reached and the need for rapid 
expansion reduces, new franchises should come to a 
halt, and the franchisor will tend to recover its most 
profitable franchised outlets (J. Combs & Jr., 2003). 
2.1 Agency theory 
Agency theory along with resource scarcity theory try 
to explain why franchisors decide to franchise varying 
proportions of outlets (Castrogiovanni, Combs, & 
Justis, 2006b). Differently the predictions of resource 
scarcity theory, franchisors do not repurchase all 
their franchised outlets when the system achieves 
maturity (Lafontaine & Kaufmann, 1994), having 
important evidences of a stable balance between 
franchised and owned outlets over time, whose 
proportion may varies between different franchise 
chains (Tracey & Jarvis, 2007). This aspect opens the 
way to other theoretical perspectives in franchising, 
such as agency theory. 
Agency theory has its roots in the theory of the 
firm – designed by Coase in his seminal article 
entitled "The Nature of the Firm" published in 1937. 
In this work, he questions the role of the firm in the 
neoclassical perspective, arguing that the economic 
system is not controlled solely by the price 
mechanism. Under this view, there are at least two 
coordination mechanisms: under the market, pricing 
system indicates the best allocation of resources, and 
in the firm, under the principle of hierarchy, the 
Authority (entrepreneur) is responsible for the 
reallocation of resources. Agency theory is grounded 
on the principal-agent relationship, having the 
information transfer process, the information 
asymmetry problem and associated monitoring costs 
as its basis (Quinn & Doherty, 2000). 
Efficiency in delivering products demanded by 
customers – at lowest prices and covering costs – is a 
basic condition of surviving for organizations, and 
efficiency under the premises of agency theory is tied 
to the control of agency problems. Agency problems 
arise with the separation between ownership and 
control, that is, when decision process in the firm is 
under control of professional managers whose 
interests are different, and often divergent, from 
those of residual claimants – separation of ownership 
and residual risk bearing from control and decision 
functions. According agency view this problem could 
be managed through decision systems separating 
management (initiation and implementation) and 
control (ratification and monitoring) (Fama & Jensen, 
1983b). Face the divergent interests the principal is 
obliged to mobilize resources in order to ensure that 
the agent acts in the best interests of the principal. 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Principals can assure 
agents´ cooperation mainly through two ways: 
monitoring or incentives for agents´ behavior in 
accordance to the principals´ interests 
(Castrogiovanni, Combs, & Justis, 2006a; Eisenhardt, 
1989). 
Agency theory offers an alternative explanation in 
comparison the resource scarcity arguments for 
adoption of franchising with focus on the concept of 
efficiency (Rubin, 1978). According this view, 
franchisees, as owners of the businesses, have an 
incentive for enduring their best efforts into the 
activities, with less need of monitoring, therefore, 
reducing monitoring cost in franchising arrangements 
(James G. Combs, Ketchen, & Hoover, 2004). One of 
the most studied factors which enable franchising to 
reduce monitoring costs is geographic dispersion 
(Castrogiovanni et al., 2006a), what is especially 
relevant when operations are in foreign countries 
(Fladmoe-Lindquist, 1996) and rural locations 
(Norton, 1988). 
Although franchising is an alternative in reducing 
need of monitoring, this does not occur without 
potential costs to franchisors. Examples of potential 
costs are risk of franchisees free riding and 
transference of specific knowledge from franchisors 
to franchisees. Franchisees can be tempted to 
maximize their outlet´s profits at the detriment of the 
franchisor´s reputation by reducing the quality of the 
product or service offered, for example, what 
commits negatively the franchisor brand value 
(Brickley & Dark, 1987; James G. Combs et al., 2004). 
Specific knowledge transference is also more 
complex in franchising arrangements than within 
firms because franchisees are not obliged sharing 
competitive practices or techniques developed or 
engaging in additional trainings, for example (James 
G. Combs et al., 2004). 
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2.2 Transaction-cost analysis 
Respecting the foundations of neoclassical economic 
behaviors, there is the emergence of contractual 
approaches of the firm, represented not only by the 
theory of agency, but also for the theory of 
transaction costs and by the theory of property rights. 
The theory of transaction costs or transaction-cost 
analysis (TCA), whose main exponent is Williamson, is 
a theory of firm governance with the transaction as 
unit of analysis, and transaction costs as opposed to 
production costs as focus of analysis. (Seggie, 2012). 
Williamson (1975) develops the hypotheses that 
there are three forms of organizational governance - 
market, hybrid and hierarchy – being each one 
supported by a different form of contract (Spinelli & 
Birley, 1996). Market governance has the letter of the 
contract as the main source for solving conflicts, that 
is, the classical contract law, where formal terms 
overlaps less formal terms (Spinelli & Birley, 1996). 
Hierarchy governance relies on the control over the 
use and disposition of assets, that is, ownership and 
integration in the same organization (Crocker & 
Masten, 1996). Finally, hybrid governance is 
associated to parties that maintain autonomy but are 
interdependent, which is the form of governance in 
franchising contracts. The ideal form of governance 
will be that which permits the lowest transaction 
costs (Seggie, 2012). 
TCA presuppose that parties engaged in a 
transaction, seek to maximize their returns, 
sometimes making use of opportunistic behavior 
(Williamson, 1979). Franchisors as well franchisees 
may behave opportunistically. Franchisors may 
overrun franchisees´ markets, terminating contracts 
before the time assigned or misrepresenting costs, 
and franchisees may pursuit their private goals in 
detriment franchisor goals, misrepresent revenues, 
withhold royalties, and deviate from franchisor 
patterns, among other possibilities (Gassenheimer, 
Baucus, & Baucus, 1996). 
Other assumptions under TCA are bounded 
rationality and risk neutrality, besides four 
dimensions of transactions – asset specificity, 
behavioral uncertainty, environmental uncertainty, 
and transaction frequency (Seggie, 2012). Asset 
specificity is a central tenet in TCA, what links this 
theory directly to the central theme in franchising – 
trademark, as an intangible asset (Spinelli & Birley, 
1996). 
TCA under the perspective of franchising has at least 
two significant implications to the question of 
ownership redirection. One of them is related to the 
possibility of opportunistic behavior as a driver for 
ownership redirection hypothesis, and the other, 
based in the governance structures of specific 
transactions, related to the prediction of ownership 
of particular outlets around the combination of 
transaction and production costs (Dant et al., 1992). 
2.3 Property rights theory 
Theory of property rights considers the firm as a set 
of contracts that constitute a structure of property 
rights. Property rights involve the notion of control 
and ownership over the use of scarce resources, and 
the rights of sales and transferences related to this 
control. According to this theory approach, the 
assignment of property rights is important to achieve 
an efficient resource allocation (Demsetz, 1966). Any 
contract will be fully complete, since specification of 
all relevant circumstances in contracts would be too 
costly and difficult to establish, so every contract will 
remain some sort of not included residual rights. 
Residual rights are responsible for the creation of 
large fraction of residual incomes, and under the 
property rights perspective they originate from assets 
not specified in the contract. Its main characteristics, 
and that which determines the ownership structure 
of the asset, is its intangibility (Hart & Moore, 1990; 
Maness, 1996). Intangible assets are difficult to be 
codified and put in contracts, since they are tied to 
knowledge, skills and know-how. In the franchising 
system, franchisors as well as franchisees are holders 
of intangible assets. 
Franchisors intangible assets are related to brand 
name and system specific know-how (Norton, 1988; 
Windsperger & Dant, 2006), while franchisees 
intangible assets are related to the local know-how - 
customer service, quality control, human resource 
management, product innovation (Sorenson & 
Sorensen, 2001; Windsperger, 2001; Windsperger & 
Dant, 2006). 
The appropriation of the residual incomes 
generated from the residual rights will be directed to 
the party that owns the residual rights, whose asset 
is relevant for the success of the network 
(Windsperger, 2001), encouraging that party to 
invest in those intangibles assets. Therefore, if the 
franchisor system-specific expertise or brand name 
value is the most critical asset to generate the 
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residual income, then the franchisor should have a 
larger part of ownership rights, reflected in high initial 
fees and royalties. Otherwise, if the franchisee local 
know-how is the most relevant asset to the success 
of the network, then the larger part of the ownership 
rights should be put upon him, reflected in low initial 
fees and royalties (Windsperger, 2001; Windsperger 
& Dant, 2006). 
2.4 Signalling theory 
An alternative theoretical view to franchising is 
offered by signaling theory. While prior theories have 
focus into internal constraints facing firms, signaling 
theory focus on the externalities of market 
imperfections and knowledge asymmetries to explain 
franchising (Dant & Kaufmann, 2003). In an 
environment where there is asymmetric information, 
firms may use several signs to provide information 
about themselves and their products, as pricing, 
advertising and warranties (Lafontaine, 1993). 
According this perspective, two primary forces drive 
such asymmetries: the nature of the subject under 
information search and the inability of individuals to 
assess informational cues. In franchising, due to the 
intangible nature of the assets (knowledge, brand, 
operational know-how), signaling is a relevant 
characteristic (Dant & Kaufmann, 2003). 
Gallini and Lutz (1992) describe franchising system 
evolution for observing dual distribution, with chains 
opening company-outlets until the point the firm is 
able to signaling the quality of their concepts, and, 
after that, establish a strategy tending toward 
franchising. This vision is opposite that of resource 
acquisition view, which defends franchising as a way 
to overcome scarcity of resources until the company 
grows and acquire enough resources for moving it 
toward the preferred strategy of company owned-
outlets (Dant & Kaufmann, 2003). 
Signaling theory also offer an explanation for 
franchisors´ choices about royalties and fees. 
Royalties and fees, as well as company ownership can 
be used as a cue about the profitability of the 
business for potential franchisees interested to join 
the chain (Gallini & Lutz, 1992). Finally, a relevant 
insight from the signaling literature in relation to 
franchising is that franchisors (at least those with a 
high-value trade name) who have not yet established 
their reputation can offer a contract that ties their 
revenues to the performance of the outlets, as a sign 
of confidence and quality (Lafontaine, 1993). 
2.5 Contemporary studies in franchising 
Despite different theories have been used to explain 
and analyzing franchising phenomenon since 1966, 
the main theories used since then continue to be the 
same (Forte & Carvalho, 2013; Madanoglu, Lee, & 
Castrogiovanni, 2013). However, mainly during the 
last 10 years, scholars begin to approach franchising 
growing with other than the traditional views. 
Institutional and/or resource base-view perspectives 
are two of these perspectives that arise with a non-
traditional economic view of franchising, although 
other perspectives who works with social (L. Altinay, 
Brookes, Madanoglu, & Aktas, 2014; Barthélemy, 
2011) and individual aspects (Dada, 2013; Dant, 
Weaven, & Baker, 2013) have increased their 
presence in the field. Probably, these two theories 
take into account the importance of to make partners 
whose help them legitimate their operation, for 
instance, in new countries (Marie Doherty, Chen, & 
Alexander, 2014) and so, to have access to different 
resources (Smith & Seawright, 2015). 
Tab. 1 
Theories, seminal works and respectively authors, and year of publication 
Theoretical Perspective Seminal Work Authors Year 
Property rights theory Some aspects of property rights. Demsetz, H. 1966 
Resource acquisition theory Will successful franchise systems ultimately become wholly-owned chains? Oxenfeldt, A.; Kelly, A. 1969 
Transaction-cost analysis Transaction-cost economics: the governance of contractual relations. Williamson, O. 1975 
Agency Theory Agency problems and residual claims Fama, E.; Jensen, M. 1983 
Separation of ownership and control. Fama, E.; Jensen, M. 1983 
Signalling theory Technology transfer under asymmetric information. Gallini, N.; Wright, B. 1990 
Dual distribution and royalty fees in franchising. Gallini, N.; Lutz, N. 1992 
RBV International franchising: capabilities and development Fladmoe-Lindquist,K 1996 
Institutional theory New Firm Survival: Institutional Explanations for New Franchisor Mortality Shane, S.; Foo, M.-D. 1999 
Source: Prepared by authors. 
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3. METHODS 
This work examines franchise systems under the 
lenses of five theories - resource constraints or 
resource acquisition theory, agency theory, 
transaction-cost analysis, property rights theory, and 
signaling theory, although there is a myriad of other 
perspectives in the literature. 
Each of these theoretical perspectives has one or 
more seminal authors, whose works were used as a 
starting point for the literature search. The Table 1 
shows the theories, seminal works and respectively 
authors, and year of publication: Web of Science 
database was used in order to seek for each of the 
seminal works related to these such five theories and 
later works published up to the year 2015, which used 
them as a reference. This research pointed to a huge 
amount of work and proportional to the importance 
of the work of each one of those authors. For each of 
the working groups associated with a particular 
author or authors of the five representatives’ 
theoretical currents, a refinement was made to select 
only those works that possess references to 
franchising, franchise, franchisor and franchisee.  
From this filter remained 182 references. As one 
of the goals of this work is to analyze the incidence of 
this theme in academic journals, chapters of books 
and articles not related to franchise were eliminated 
from the sample, which led to a final number of 130 
articles in academic journals. From this selection, 
after reading the articles, it was registered the names 
of the periodicals, authors, year of publication, 
variables analyzed in the study, measures, 
methodology and theoretical orientation.  
After tabulating the data, we applied descriptive 
statistics to identify the principal authors who have 
published, the most used methods, the journals that 
published more on this topic, the evolution of these 
publications a year, the theories used and the 
dependent and independent variables pointed out by 
the most relevant authors on the topic.  
4. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
From the 130 studies, the most part (32%) used 
agency theory approaches, which is almost 3 times 
more than the second most used view – signaling 
theory (13%). Table 2 shows the distribution of 
theoretical approaches along the 130 papers. (Some 
of the articles have more than one theoretical 
approach. In such cases, all the theories were 
considered to the analysis). 
Tab. 2 
Theoretical approaches 
Theory No. Papers % 
Agency Theory 52 32 
Signalling Theory 21 13 
Resource Scarcity Theory 20 12 
Transaction Cost Analysis 12 7 
Institutional Theory 7 4 
Property Rights 7 4 
RBV 7 4 
Plural Theory 6 4 
Entrepreneurial Orientation 2 1 
Game Theory 2 1 
Resource Dependence Theory 2 1 
Risk-Sharing Theory 2 1 
Social Exchange Theory 2 1 
Stakeholder Theory 2 1 
Tournament Theory 2 1 
Other Theories 18 11 
Source: Prepared by authors. 
Although articles with the four main theories 
approaches sum more than 64% of the works, during 
the last 15 years, more and more theories have been 
used in order to analyze franchising phenomenon 
Table 3, showing the rising and the relevance of the 
field. 
Tab. 3 
Theoretical approach distribution over the years 
Period Theories N 
1969-1989 
Agency Theory 2 
Resource Scarcity Theory 1 
1990-1999 
Agency Theory 11 
Signalling Theory 10 
Transaction Cost Analysis 6 
Resource Scarcity Theory 3 
Game Theory 1 
General Theory of Franchising 1 
Institutional Theory 1 
Plural Theory 1 
RBV 1 
Resource Dependence Theory 1 
Risk-Sharing Theory 1 
2000-2009 
Agency Theory 27 
Resource Scarcity Theory 13 
Signalling Theory 6 
Plural Theory 4 
Property Rights 4 
Transaction Cost Analysis 4 
RBV 3 
Institutional Theory 2 
Firm Theory 1 
Game Theory 1 
Stakeholder Theory 1 
Upper Echellons Theory 1 
CONTINUE   
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2010-2016 
Agency Theory 12 
Signalling Theory 5 
Institutional Theory 4 
Property Rights 3 
RBV 3 
Resource Scarcity Theory 3 
Entrepreneurial Orientation 2 
Social Exchange Theory 2 
Tournament Theory 2 
Transaction Cost Analysis 2 
Commitment Theory 1 
Contingency Theory 1 
Contingency Theory  1 
Information Processing Theory 1 
Networks 1 
Organizational Ecology 1 
Organizational Identity Theory  1 
Plural Theory 1 
Power-Dependence 1 
Relational Governance 1 
Relationship-Marketing 1 
Resource Dependence Theory 1 
Risk-Sharing Theory 1 
Specific Knowledge Theory 1 
Stakeholder Theory 1 
Strategic Deviance Theory 1 
Learning Theory  1 
Momentum Individual Motivation 1 
International Business 1 
Source: Prepared by authors. 
More recent works have introduced new 
perspectives to franchising, such as institutional 
theory (Barthélemy, 2011; J. G. Combs, Michael, & 
Castrogiovanni, 2009; Zachary, McKenny, Short, 
Davis, & Wu, 2011) and resource-based view 
(RBV)(James G. Combs et al., 2011; Polo-Redondo, 
Bordonaba-Juste, & Palacios, 2011), stressing the 
relevance of others aspects to franchising beyond the 
traditional firm-specific economic factors. Such 
factors, associated to social forces, capabilities, and 
individual characteristics of franchisees and 
franchisors have achieved prominence in the field, 
and seems to present new avenues to franchising 
research.  
Tab. 4 
Main journals 
Journals No. of Articles 
Journal of Business Venturing 11 
Journal of Small Business Management 10 
Journal of Retailing 9 
European Journal of Marketing 7 
Service Industries Journal 7 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 6 
Journal of Business Research 6 
Source: Prepared by authors.  
From 1966 to 2015, seminal works tied to the 5 
theoretical perspectives examined under the field of 
franchising, generated: 
▪ 130 articles, in 53 journals, by 155 authors, 
using 32 different theoretical perspectives; 
▪ 51 different dependent variables, being the 
most used “ownership” (31 times), 
“performance” (18 times) and 
“royalty”/”fees” (7 times); 
▪ 93 different independent variables, being the 
most used “age/experience” (32 times), 
“size” (21 times), “royalties/fees” (20 times), 
“growth” (16 times), and 
“internationalization” (13 times); 
Along these 130 articles, the authors with more 
number of publications were J.G. Combs (10), R.P. 
Dant (9), S.C. Michael (9), F. Lafontaine (7), J. 
Windsperger (4), G.J. Castrogiovanni (6), P.J. 
Kaufmann (6), and D.J. Ketchen (5). Table 4 shows the 
main journals which have published works on 
franchising, and Table 5 show the publications in 
these journals over the years. Table 6 shows the most 
used methodological techniques (many articles have 
more than one methodological technique. In such 
cases, all the techniques were considered to the 
analysis). 
Tab. 5 
Publications in these journals over the years 
Period Journals N 
1969 
- 
1989 
Journal of Business 1 
Journal of Financial Economics 1 
Journal of Law & Economics 1 
Journal of Retailing 1 
1990 
- 
1999 
Journal of Business Venturing 6 
Journal of Law Economics & Organization 2 
Journal of Political Economy 2 
Journal of Retailing 2 
Journal of Small Business Management 2 
Management Science 2 
Rand Journal of Economics 2 
Academy of Management Journal 1 
Applied Economics 1 
International Journal of Industrial Organization 1 
Journal of Business Research 1 
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 1 
Journal of International Marketing 1 
Journal of Law & Economics 1 
Journal of Management 1 
Journal of Marketing Research 1 
Journal of Public Policy & Marketing 1 
Journal of Regulatory Economics 1 
Organization Science 1 
Review of Industrial Organization 1 
Strategic Management Journal 1 
CONTINUE   
 
L. F. Varotto and L. Aureliano-Silva 
Internext | São Paulo, v.12, n. 3, p. 31-42, sep./dec. 2017 
38 
2000 
– 
2009 
Journal of Small Business Management 5 
Service Industries Journal 5 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 3 
Journal of Business Venturing 3 
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 3 
Journal of Management 3 
Journal of Retailing 3 
Strategic Management Journal 3 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 3 
Journal of Business Research 2 
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 2 
Accounting Review 1 
Applied Economics 1 
Cuadernos De Economia Y Direccion De La Empresa 1 
Economic Institutions of Strategy 1 
Economics Letters 1 
European Journal of Marketing 1 
European Management Journal 1 
Health Policy and Planning 1 
International Journal of Hospitality Management 1 
International Journal of Service Industry Management 1 
International Marketing Review 1 
International Small Business Journal 1 
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 
Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft 
1 
Journal of Law & Economics 1 
Journal of Law Economics & Organization 1 
Journal of Marketing 1 
Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics 1 
Journal of Real Estate Research 1 
Management Science 1 
Rand Journal of Economics 1 
Service Business 1 
Cuadernos De Economia Y Direccion De La Empresa 1 
2010 
- 
2016 
European Journal of Marketing 6 
Journal of Business Research 3 
Journal of Retailing 3 
Journal of Small Business Management 3 
International Small Business Journal 2 
Journal of Business Venturing 2 
Service Industries Journal 2 
International Entrepreneurship and Management J. 1 
Japan and the World Economy 1 
Journal of Hospitality & Tourism Research 1 
Journal of International Marketing 1 
Journal of Management 1 
Journal of Marketing Channels 1 
Journal of Marketing Research 1 
Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science 1 
Journal of World Business 1 
Management International Review 1 
Service Business 1 
Strategic Management Journal 1 
Urban Affairs Review 1 
Source: Prepared by authors. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
As can be seen from the extensive bibliographic 
research, five major theoretical perspectives are 
highlighted in the last 50 years - the agency theory, 
resource-scarcity theory, signaling theory, 
transaction costs analysis, and property rights theory. 
Although these perspectives have been dominating 
the research in this area, other theoretical 
perspectives, some of them with a less economical 
connotation than those traditional, have been 
increasing its prominence. 
Tab. 6 
Most used methodological techniques 
Methods No. of Articles 
Regression analysis 23 
Theoretical review 22 
Logit regression analysis 18 
Factor analysis 12 
MANOVA/ ANOVA 14 
OLS regression analysis 8 
Case study 7 
Structural equation modeling 6 
Cluster analysis 5 
Correlationship analysis 5 
Econometric model 4 
GLS estimation 4 
Others 39 
Source: Prepared by authors. 
The emergence of new theoretical perspectives also 
opens space for the study of new constructs, which 
ultimately further enrich the field of research in 
franchising. 
Through the analysis is possible to realize a great 
degree of centrality of six periodicals - Journal of 
Business Venturing, Journal of Small Business 
Management, Journal of Retailing, European Journal 
of Marketing, Service Industries Journal, and 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, that seem to 
be the main influential journals in the field of 
franchising. The degree of centrality also on 
methodological issues is quite relevant, prevailing 
quantitative studies with intensive use of several 
techniques of regression analysis, although 
theoretical reviews also occupy an important space in 
the research of the field. 
This paper contributes to deepen the knowledge 
about the theory in franchising, as well as identifying 
trends and new perspectives of study. By showing the 
theoretical evolution of the field along the last 50 
years, identifying the main theories, authors, 
periodicals, and methodologies contributes to show 
which are the main pillars where the theory in 
franchising was built, and shows the possibilities and 
perspectives of research in the area. 
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Franchising como um conceito legal ou de marketing não é recente. Ele surge como 
como um sistema de negócios estruturado nos EUA, por volta de 1860 quando a The 
Singer Company estabelece uma rede de revendas para máquinas de costura. 
Atualmente o franchising é uma das formas de negócio de mais rápido crescimento 
no mundo. A evolução das teorias que buscam explicar os sistemas de franquia tem 
sido publicadas em periódicos acadêmicos de tempos em tempos, mas até o 
momento não houve um estudo que tenha estabelecido uma análise de rede social 
para quantificar o grau de centralidade e de coesão do relacionamento entre os 
principais autores, periódicos, métodos e teorias em franquia. Por isso o principal 
propósito deste estudo é o de ampliar o conhecimento sobre franchising por meio 
de uma extensa pesquisa sobre suas principais perspectivas teóricas em periódicos 
acadêmicos internacionais relevantes, mostrando a evolução da área, ressaltando 
as suas principais questões, autores e métodos. Por meio de uma seleção de 130 
artigos de 1966 a 2015, o estudo investiga cinco teorias relevantes em franquias: (1) 
Teoria da Aquisição de Recursos, (2) Teoria da Agência, (3) Analise dos Custos de 
Transação, (4) Teoria da Sinalização, e (5) Teoria dos Direitos de Propriedade. Uma 
análise estatística de característica descritiva foi realizada com o objetivo de 
identificar os principais autores e tendências com as teorias mais utilizadas em 
artigos sobre franquias. As descobertas mostram a Teoria da Agência, a Teoria da 
Sinalização e a Teoria da Aquisição de Recursos como as principais perspectivas 
utilizadas em estudos sobre franchising, mas outras perspectivas têm ampliado sua 
presença, principalmente a Teoria Institucional e a Perspectiva Baseada em 
Recursos. As principais variáveis dependentes e independentes cobrem uma ampla 
variedade de construtos, porém propriedade, desempenho, idade, tamanho, 
crescimento, dispersão geográfica e internacionalização tem sido as mais citadas. 
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